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DUBIOUS DOCTRINES: THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION 
Linda S. Mullenix* 
The court here is faced with a procedural invention of unknown origin 
which bears a remarkable resemblance to the class action and which has 




In the past few years, the term ―quasi-class action‖ has been 
appearing with increasing, uncritical frequency in a spate of federal 
court decisions.2  While it may be premature to characterize these 
sporadic references as a trend,3 it is perhaps soon enough to call 
attention to the misuse of loose labels that carry with them significant 
consequences.  Before the quasi-class action gains any further traction, 
there are several valid reasons for definitively quashing this quasi.4 
Three simple points about the quasi-class action.  First, there is no 
such thing as a quasi-class action.  A quasi-class action brings to mind 
the old joke about being slightly pregnant.  Hence, either you are a class 
action, or you are not.  There is no constitutional, statutory, doctrinal, or 
other basis for the quasi-class action.  The label quasi-class action is a 
convenient, lazy fabrication to justify the lawless administration of 
aggregate claims. 
Second, whatever historical antecedents or analogues may exist for 
the concept of a quasi-class action, the 1966 amendments to Rule 235 
the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Amchem6 and Ortiz,7 and multiple 
class actions decisions lay to rest any notions of a quasi-class action.  
 
 * Morris and Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, The University of Texas School of Law. 
 1. Fla. Power Corp. v. Granlund, 82 F.R.D. 690, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1979). 
 2. A Westlaw search in the ―Allfeds‖ database of the term ―quasi-class action,‖ in February 
2011, located sixty-eight federal cases citing the term. 
 3. But see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 116 (2010) (characterizing 
the newly-created quasi-class action as an ―emerging doctrine that MDLs are ‗quasi-class actions,‖ and 
endorsing expanded judicial powers for MDL judges managing such quasi-class actions.  Cf. In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 n.4 (E.D. La. 2010) (rejecting the suggestion by 
Professor Silver and Miller that attorneys in MDL proceedings should select the Plaintiffs‘ Steering 
Committee with the attorney with the largest number of cases having the laboring oar: ―But the 
experience of MDL courts suggest otherwise.‖). 
 4. The quasi-class action should perhaps be interred with its remote doctrinal cousin, quasi in 
rem jurisdiction.  See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (outlining the federal class action rule). 
 6. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 7. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
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The entire point of the class action rule is not only to supply an 
aggregate mechanism for efficiently resolving multiple claims, but also 
to balance efficiency values with the due process protection of absent 
class members in representative litigation.  The so-called quasi-class 
action is the antithesis of due process.  The quasi-class action is a 
jurisprudential oxymoron that its proponents deploy to justify the 
expeditious resolution of aggregate claims, while failing to adequately 
protect the interests of claimants. 
Third, the quasi-class action ought to be repudiated as an unfortunate 
drift into further lawlessness in administering aggregate claims.8  Over 
the past thirty years, actors involved in resolving aggregate claims—
especially aggregate tort claims—have embraced claims-resolution 
models that allow malefactors to control, manage, and settle their 
liabilities on highly preferential terms, permit plaintiffs‘ attorneys to 
reap bountiful and often excessive fees, and enable heroic judges (and 
their heroic surrogates) to clear their dockets of large numbers of cases. 
The interests of powerful, well-funded, and self-interested actors have 
tacitly converged to support a de facto collusive model of aggregate-
claims resolution.  In the past three decades, federal courts—including 
the Supreme Court—have rejected collusive backroom aggregate 
settlement deals that do not adequately protect the interests of class 
members.  In response, and in order to be free of formal class action 
constraints, self-interested actors on both sides of the docket have co-
opted the federal multidistrict litigation procedure (MDL)9 to provide a 
staging-ground for the private resolution of aggregate claims.  The most 
extreme variant of private aggregate claims resolution, completely 
outside the scrutiny of judicial management and review, is exemplified 
by fund approaches to mass-claims resolution—most recently the Gulf 
Coast Claims Facility. 
In the judicial arena, there are good reasons why mass litigation 
lawyers now love MDL procedure, whereas they eschewed this 
mechanism in the past.  Because the formal class action rule became an 
inconvenient impediment to resolving aggregate claims favorably to 
both plaintiff and defense interests, actors involved in mass litigation 
now promote MDL procedure and the quasi-class action concept as an 
entirely useful, creative legal fiction to accomplish self-interested goals. 
It is not at all surprising that self-interested negotiators and some 
federal MDL judges have embraced the concept of the quasi-class action 
as the most effective means to resolve massive liabilities.  Since 2005 
private actors have evolved the nearly perfect model for accomplishing 
 
 8. See generally THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3 (2010). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
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self-dealing agreements by manipulating MDL procedure to accomplish 
ends this mechanism was never intended to perform.  Hence, resolving 
mass claims under MDL auspices and the penumbra of the quasi-class 
action effectively does an end-run around the class action rule, and 
liberates deal-makers from having to adequately protect the interests of 
injured claimants. 
The deployment of MDL jurisdiction, with the quasi-class action 
fiction engrafted onto MDL procedure, has stripped away protections 
afforded by class action requirements.  Mass litigation actors may now 
settle complex cases largely unconstrained by law.  What the class 
action bar could not achieve through decades of judicial decisions—
such as elimination of the need for an adequate class representative—
has effectively been achieved through adroit manipulation of MDL 
procedure and the ministrations of selected heroic judges and their 
special masters. 
Before the inspired fabrication of the quasi-class action, global 
agreements accomplished under MDL auspices had to be settled 
pursuant to formal class requirements and due process protections.  By 
engrafting the label quasi-class action onto MDL procedure, self-
interested actors have created a perfect staging ground for negotiating 
back-room deals that carry a false aura of judicial legitimacy, liberated 
from the constraints of the formal class action rule.  
MDL judges, in turn, by endorsing the concept of the quasi-class 
action have greatly expanded the scope of their authority and have 
become complicit in allowing private parties to accomplish the very 
backdoor settlements that the Supreme Court and federal courts have 
disallowed for decades.  The quasi-class action, then, represents an 
ultimate, cynical expression of an aggregate claims-resolution model 
that enables self-interested actors to resolve claims in the actors‘ best 
interests rather than the interests of injured claimants. 
II. THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A QUASI-CLASS ACTION: THE 
EMERGENCE OF A DOCTRINAL PHANTASM 
A. Documenting the Drift Towards the Quasi-Class Action: A 
Fabricated “Trend”? 
At first blush, the sheer frequency of federal use of the term quasi-
class action would seem to suggest that the quasi-class action is a well-
recognized and well-established doctrine in federal jurisprudence.  Since 
1946, sixty-eight federal cases have cited the label.  However, careful 
reading of this case law suggests an entirely different conclusion: the 
quasi-class action is a phantasm.  None of these cases actually discussed 
3
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the concept of the quasi-class action, and rarely-cited authority is 
inapposite or inaccurate. 
Of the sixty-eight cases deploying the label quasi-class action, thirty-
two decisions—almost half—are boilerplate, repetitive and self-
referential citations to a single litigation: the Zyprexa products liability 
litigation under Judge Jack Weinstein‘s supervision in the Eastern 
District of New York.10  The Zyprexa court‘s usage of the quasi-class 
action label is discussed below.  However, of the fifty-five cases using 
the term since 2006, thirty-two were piecemeal orders in the Zyprexa 
litigation, which rotely recite that the litigation was conducted as a 
quasi-class action.  Hence, the label quasi-class action largely has 
emerged in the past five years, in one mass tort litigation. 
In addition to the thirty-two repetitive Zyprexa decisions, Judge Jack 
Weinstein has used the term quasi-class action in five other decisions to 
describe aggregate litigation before him;11 three orders involved the 
same Staten Island Ferry crash litigation.  Hence, of sixty-eight cases 
that reference the quasi-class action, thirty-seven are by Judge 
Weinstein.  Judge Weinstein, then, through sheer force of will and 
identical repetition in thirty-two Zyprexa orders and five other cases, 
may be credited with bullying the quasi-class action label into judicial 
consciousness. 
Of the thirty-six non-Zyprexa cases using the term quasi-class action, 
none explain what a quasi-class action is or the authoritative support for 
such a concept.  Instead, the term quasi-class action is more often cited 
in passing.  For example, a set of cases under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act12 refer to the label quasi-class action.  The FSLA (Act) provides 
 
 10. The original Zyprexa case citation is In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).  As discussed later in this Article, there are thirty-two separate decisions and orders in 
the ongoing Zyprexa litigation, all which are denominated as ―In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.‖ 
 11. See McMillan v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2887, 2010 WL 1487738, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 13, 2010) (addressing Staten Island Ferry crash litigation; attorney fee dispute, stating, ―The 
benefits of that aspect of this quasi-class action litigation allegedly accrued to hundreds of injured 
claimants, including the clients.‖); McMillan v. City of New York, No. CV 08 2887 (JBW)(VVP), 2010 
WL 1459218 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2010) (relating the Report and Recommendation of the U.S. 
Magistrate on attorney fee dispute; referring to claimant‘s damage award as being comparable in a sense 
to a ―quasi-aggregate or quasi-class action‖); McMillan v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-6049, 2008 
WL 4287573 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2010) (concerning attorney fee dispute; ―in a sense this was a 
quasi aggregate or quasi class action with increased power to control fees.‖) (citing In re Zyprexa Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey Inc. v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 162, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing third-party payor litigation 
against tobacco company defendant; ―Defendants have not raised the point that, in a sense the class 
action or quasi-class action such as the present one, where many claims are aggregated, takes care of the 
problem of social payment for the full cost of damages a defendant caused.‖); United States v. Cheung, 
952 F. Supp. 148, 148–49) (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (concerning federal restitution action for criminal actions; 
―What was in effect a civil quasi-class action is coordinated with a criminal proceeding to assure 
maximum recovery by the victims with minimum transactional costs.‖). 
 12. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (2006) [hereinafter FLSA]. 
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employees with a private right of action to sue an employer for 
violations of the Act ―for and in behalf of himself or themselves and 
other employees similarly situated.‖13  Federal courts have recognized 
that the FSLA authorizes collective actions.14 
FLSA actions are unique and subject to idiosyncratic statutory 
procedures, including opt-in requirements, a two-step certification 
procedure, and distinctive discovery rules.15  Federal courts agree that 
FSLA lawsuits are not class actions subject to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.16  In discussing FSLA procedure, however, some courts 
have noted—with the briefest, passing mention—that the collective 
nature of an FSLA lawsuit resembles a quasi-class action.17  In all FSLA 
decisions, that is the extent of the reference to the quasi-class action; 
FSLA decisions are entirely devoid of doctrinal discussion of the quasi-
class action.  Instead, the FSLA decisions merely acknowledge the 
mimicking effect of one type of statutory procedure for another. 
Another series of Mississippi federal cases, in property damage 
insurance litigation arising out of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, refer to 
the label quasi-class action.18  These brief decisions recognize the quasi-
class action for what it actually is: an attempt to accomplish by label 
what is otherwise prohibited by doctrine.  In 2006, the federal district 
court in Mississippi refused to certify three proposed class actions 
alleging property damage claims because of the highly individualized 
issues that defeated class certification under Rule 23.19  In the aftermath 
 
 13. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2008). 
 14. Abubakar v. City of Solano, No. CIV S-06-2268 LKK EFB, 2008 WL 508911(E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 22, 2008). 
 15. Id. at *2. 
 16. Douglas v. GE Energy Reuter Stokes, No. 1:07CV077, 2007 WL 1341779 at *3 (N.D. Ohio 
Apr. 30, 2007); Highland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CIV04-0711, 2005 WL 3415855 at *1, n.1 
(D.N.M. Sept. 15, 2005); Montalto v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 83 F.R.D. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 17. Douglas, 2007 WL 1341779 at *3 (citing Montalto, 83 F.R.D. 150); see also Highland, 2005 
WL 3415855 at *1, n.1 (―This type of quasi-class action, governed by the FSLA, does not proceed under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23); Hallas v. Western Electric Co., Inc., No. C-2-79-519, 1981 WL 205 at *2 (S.D. 
Ohio 1981); Cowlishaw v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 425 F. Supp. 802, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Swettman v. 
Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Ill. 1946). 
 18. See McFarland v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIVA1:06CV466LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 
3071988, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 2006); McFarland v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV466-
LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2577852, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2006) (Magistrate Judge‘s Order of 
Severance), aff’d, 2006 WL 3071988; Vaz v. Allstate Property & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV481 LTS RHW, 
2006 WL 2583733, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2006) (Magistrate‘s Order of Severance); Bradley v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:06CV528-LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2594548, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 
2006) (Magistrate‘s Order of Severance). 
 19. See Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV1-LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2359474 (S.D. 
Miss. Aug. 14, 2006); see also Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05cv436 LTS-RHW, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33123, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006) (―Each property owner in Mississippi who 
had real and personal property damaged in Hurricane Katrina is uniquely situated. No two property 
owners will have experienced the same losses. The nature and the extent of the property damage the 
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of these rulings, plaintiffs‘ attorneys then filed lawsuits that individually 
joined hundreds of plaintiffs‘ claims against various insurance 
companies. 
When the court sua sponte questioned whether it should sever 
individual claims,20 the magistrate recommended severance, noting that 
the court recently denied attempts to certify Hurricane Katrina property 
damage classes.21  The magistrate presciently recognized the problem 
with the plaintiffs‘ creative, renewed end-run around the class action 
rule: ―In essence, Plaintiffs have filed what amounts to a quasi-class 
action lawsuit but without regard for the rigid requirements for class 
certification.‖22 
Following the magistrate‘s recommendations, the court recognized 
and resisted the lawyers‘ attempts to highjack mass joinder procedure as 
a method for accomplishing an end-run around the class action rule.  In 
adopting the magistrate‘s recommendations, the judge similarly 
observed: 
It would also be inconsistent for this Court to deny class certification in a 
setting where similar broad claims were made and at the same time allow 
the instant action to go forward in what the Magistrate accurately 
described as a ‗quasi-class action lawsuit but without regard for the rigid 
requirements for class certification.
23
 
The remaining grab-bag of cases citing the quasi-class action label are 
similarly devoid of doctrinal analysis, but typically represent a court‘s 
short-hand description for collective litigation where numerous plaintiffs 
are consolidated under simple joinder rules.24  Not only do these cases 
 
owners sustain from the common cause, Hurricane Katrina, will vary in particulars, depending on the 
location and condition of the property before the storm struck and depending also on what combination 
of forces caused the damage . . . the undersigned [Judge Senter] finds that the same considerations that 
applied in Guice and Comer, apply to the instant case as well.‖). 
 20. McFarland, 2006 WL 2577852, at *1. 
 21. Id. at *2. 
 22. Id. at *2 (citing Guice, 2006 WL 2359474).  As is typical of citations to the label quasi-class 
action, the same magistrate judge repeated this exact identical language in three similar cases. 
 23. McFarland, 2006 WL 3071988, at *2. 
 24. See, e.g., Avila v. Willits Env‘t, No. C 99-03941 SI, 2009 WL 4254367, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 24, 2009) (relating to taxing of litigation costs in toxic tort litigation; over 110 plaintiffs 
consolidated in one suit; ―the case operated like a quasi-class action), vacated, 633 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1552, 2011 WL 4530474 (Oct. 3, 2011); United States v. Gallion, 257 
F.R.D. 141, 158 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (disqualifying proposed expert; passing reference to attorney Stan 
Chesley as an attorney who had participated in ―mass tort quasi class actions); In re Guidant Corp. 
Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05 1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *6 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (considering attorney fees in defibrillator MDL proceeding after settlement; 
―Before this Court is a coordinated litigation of many individual yet related cases that effectively is, and 
proceeded as, a quasi-class action.‖); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288(DLC), 2004 
WL 113484, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004) (referencing plaintiffs‘ parallel and vexatious de facto class 
action, also labeled as a quasi-class action, without further elaboration); In re Desrosiers, 212 B.R. 716, 
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have nothing in common, but none described, endorsed, enlightened, or 
otherwise supplied meaningful content to the label of quasi-class action. 
B. The Zyprexa Litigation and the Invention of the Quasi-Class Action 
It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that Judge Jack Weinstein 
single-handedly invented the quasi-class action, and it should come as 
little surprise that the term quasi-class action has been given its most 
robust voice by Judge Weinstein in his judicial management of the 
Zyprexa litigation.25  The Zyprexa litigation involved a complicated 
array of lawsuits brought by individual consumers of the 
pharmaceutical,26 third-party payors such as unions and health plans,27 
 
725 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (rejecting debtors‘ contention that former lawsuit was a class action or 
quasi-class action); Gordon and Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. Physics, 905 F. Supp. 169, 179 
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (deciding res judicata; footnote mention of relationship of concepts of virtual 
representation, privity, and quasi-class action status; no meaningful discussion); Joseph v. Hage, 121 
B.R. 679, 682 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990) (―In addition to the general body of creditors as beneficiaries of 
a quasi-class action pursuant to Code § 727(a); no discussion of concept of quasi class action); Fla. 
Power Corp. v. Granlund, 82 F.R.D. 690, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (referencing a quasi-class action in 
absence of certification under Rule 23); EEOC v. Rexene Polymers Co., MO-74-CA-62, 1975 WL 121 
(W.D. Tex. 1975) (standing issue relating to EEOC; ―Although the defendant has raised an academically 
interesting class action question, the Court finds it unnecessary to address itself to the issue raised in 
regard to whether this suit is properly labeled a class action, quasi-class action, or whatever other label 
might be appropriate.‖). 
 25. The Zyprexa litigation was not the first case in which Judge Weinstein used the term quasi-
class action, nor the last.  See supra note 11.  However, the Zyprexa litigation is significant in that it 
spawned no fewer than thirty-two separate orders in which Judge Weinstein repeated that he conducted 
the Zyprexa litigation as a quasi-class action. 
 26. This article addresses only the individual Zyprexa lawsuits that were collected and 
transferred pursuant to the MDL statute in March 2004. See Complaint, Benjamin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
No. 04-CV-893 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  This article does not address the parallel third-party-payor litigation, 
or the actions pursued and settlements achieved by the federal government. 
 27. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Practice: A Recent Blow for Third-Party-Payor Plaintiffs: 2d 
Circuit Reversed Class Certification in Zyprexa Case, Disapproving of Plaintiffs’ Classwide Reliance 
Theories, 33 NAT‘L L.J. 32 (Oct. 18, 2010) (discussing UFCW Local 1776 and Participating Emp‘rs 
Health and Welfare Fund v. Eli Lilly and Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2010)); see also 
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting Judge Weinstein class 
certification of tobacco third-party-plaintiff class action based on reliance problems) abrogated by 
UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d 121; In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing Judge 
Weinstein class certification of third party-payor tobacco class action).  In the third-party-payor 
litigation, individual users of Zyprexa, and insurers and unions as third-party plaintiffs, sued Eli Lilly, 
the manufacturer of Zyprexa, in a class action.  Zyprexa is an antipsychotic pharmaceutical that the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration originally approved for treatment of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  
TPPs underwrite the purchase of prescription drugs for their members and insureds.  The class was 
composed of two subclasses of individual purchasers and TPPs that paid for Zyprexa prescriptions. 
The plaintiffs alleged that Lilly had misrepresented to physicians Zyprexa's efficacy and side effects, 
including weight gain, hyperglycemia and diabetes.  The plaintiffs alleged that Lilly falsely claimed that 
Zyprexa was more effective than other antipsychotics and promoted off-label use to treat depression, 
anxiety and dementia. 
These misrepresentations, the plaintiffs contended, resulted in a greater demand for Zyprexa—at a 
higher price—than would have existed if accurate information about Zyprexa's efficacy and risks were 
7
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and civil and criminal proceedings by the federal government.  These 
actions were brought against the pharmaceutical‘s manufacturer, Eli 
Lilly. 
Zyprexa is an antipsychotic pharmaceutical that the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration originally approved for treatment of schizophrenia 
and bipolar disorder.  The plaintiffs alleged that Eli Lilly had 
misrepresented to physicians Zyprexa‘s efficacy and side effects, which 
included weight gain, hyperglycemia, and diabetes.  The plaintiffs 
alleged that Lilly falsely claimed that Zyprexa was more effective than 
other antipsychotics and promoted off-label use to treat depression, 
anxiety, and dementia. 
Thousands of lawsuits against Eli Lilly were filed in both federal and 
state courts.  In March of 2004 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation created a Zyprexa MDL in the Eastern District of New York 
to be managed by Judge Jack Weinstein.28  As a consequence of the 
MDL order, thousands of individual Zyprexa cases were transferred 
 
known.  Consequently, the plaintiffs alleged that class members were injured by paying for Zyprexa 
prescriptions that would not have issued but for the alleged misrepresentations (the ‗quantity theory‘) 
and by paying a higher price for Zyprexa than would have been charged without the alleged 
misrepresentations (the ‗excessive price‘ theory). 
The plaintiffs asserted five claims: a civil RICO claim based on the predicate act of mail fraud, 
conspiracy to violate RICO, violation of state consumer protection laws, common law fraud and unjust 
enrichment.  The plaintiffs posited two damage theories: first, a quantity effect theory, claiming that the 
improper promotion of off-label use resulted in more off-label prescriptions than otherwise would have 
been written, and, second, a loss-of-value or excess-price theory, claiming the monetary difference 
between what the plaintiffs were led to believe was Zyprexa‘s worth and Zyprexa‘s actual worth.  The 
plaintiffs estimated the value of their overpayments at between $4 billion and $7.7 billion. 
On Sept. 5, 2008, Weinstein certified a TPPs‘ RICO class predicated on the overpricing theory but 
declined to certify an individual payor class or one based on state consumer-protection laws.  The court 
found that the class could use generalized proof to show that Zyprexa was overpriced as a result of 
Lilly‘s excessive claims of utility as well as its disavowal of secondary effects.  Weinstein held that the 
plaintiffs could prove reliance on a classwide basis because the alleged fraud was directed through 
mailings on which doctors relied, causing TPP overpayments.  See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 
F.R.D. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  Weinstein denied the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment. In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated in part by UFCW Local 
1776, 620 F.3d 121. 
The Second Circuit reversed class certification, holding that, pursuant to recent U.S. Supreme Court 
and Second Circuit precedents, plaintiffs must allege and prove third-party reliance as part of their chain 
of causation in a RICO claim.  See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (holding 
plaintiff alleging RICO mail fraud claim is not required to show first-person reliance); City of New 
York v. Smokes Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 44 n.24 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting RICO plaintiff must 
establish at least third-party reliance in order to prove causation; complete absence of reliance may 
prevent plaintiff from establishing proximate cause). 
 28. See Letter from Multidistrict Litigation Panel to Clerk of the Eastern District of New York, 
in In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, Docket Entry No. 1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2004). 
Throughout federal coordination of federal Zyprexa cases, state courts also were managing state 
Zyprexa cases. Many state Zyprexa cases were removed to federal court.  See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2009 WL 5062109 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009), aff’d sub nom., Gove v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 394 Fed. App‘x 817 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 316 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (communicating to state judges on cooperation between federal and state judges). 
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from federal district courts throughout the United States in March 
2004.29  Judge Weinstein supervised the Zyprexa MDL litigation and in 
2006 the parties accomplished a non-class settlement of consumer 
claims under the auspices of the Zyprexa MDL.30  Since then, Judge 
Weinstein has issued numerous orders dealing with various trailing 
issues in the wake of the Zyprexa settlement. 
The core issue that prompted Judge Weinstein to invoke the concept 
of the quasi-class action focused on an attorney fee dispute.  In class 
action litigation, attorney fees are subject to judicial scrutiny and 
approval.31  Although there are different methodologies for determining 
attorney fees in class action litigation,32 the most common method 
calculates fees based on a percentage of the common-benefit fund that 
the attorneys negotiate on behalf of the class claimants.33 
The Zyprexa litigation, however, was not resolved as a class action 
settlement and therefore theoretically was not subject to any class action 
constraints, such as judicial review of the attorney fee requests.  
Consequently, some plaintiffs‘ attorneys sought to enforce privately 
negotiated contingent fee contracts, which would have provided attorney 
fees in excess of those typically awarded in common-benefit class 
litigation. 
Judge Weinstein apparently believed these privately negotiated fee 
contracts would reward excessive fees to the attorneys, and were unfair 
to claimants.  In order to block enforcement of the contingent fee 
contracts, Judge Weinstein requested that the special masters assisting 
him in the Zyprexa litigation to adjust the requested attorney fee 
schedules.34  In issuing this order, Judge Weinstein declared that the 
 
 29. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 316. 
 30. After an initial round of claims settlement, Judge Weinstein appointed a second plaintiffs‘ 
steering committee to deal with additional Zyprexa cases transferred to the MDL court after the initial 
settlement.  For a brief history of the settlement and post-settlement proceedings, see In re Zyprexa 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (referring to the Zyprexa litigation‘s quasi-
class action status; denying certain plaintiffs‘ request for remand of cases from the MDL court to their 
original transferor courts). 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
 32. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 14 (4th ed. 2004). 
 33. Id.  The other common method for determining attorney fees in class litigation is the lodestar 
method, which requires plaintiffs‘ attorneys to keep detailed billing records of time expended in the 
representation, as well as detailed records of other fees and expenses.  The court then adjusts actual 
billing fees by a lodestar, which effectively is a multiplier to account for assumption of risk, loss 
opportunity costs, and similar factors in pursuing class litigation on behalf of claimants.  
 34. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (containing the first of 
series of Zyprexa orders invoking the concept of the quasi-class action; instructing special masters to 
―consider a fee that shall be the lesser of the maximum reasonable general fee schedule they 
recommend, the fee agreed upon between the client and the attorney in an individual case, and the 
maximum amount permitted under the applicable local state rules or statutes.‖); see also In re Zyprexa 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2008 WL 2511791 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) (describing fee 
9
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Zyprexa litigation had been administered as a quasi-class action, which 
theoretically provided Judge Weinstein with the authority to adjust 
attorney fees.35  
Judge Weinstein‘s brief allusion to the quasi-class action in the 
context of the attorney fee dispute—and the authority for this 
construct—is discussed below.  However, even though the quasi-class 
action had its origins in the Zyprexa attorney fee dispute, it is important 
to note that the concept has gained traction in no small part because of 
Judge Weinstein‘s repeated citation to the label in numerous subsequent 
published opinions and orders.  It is almost as if repeated incantation of 
a phrase can bring an avatar into actuality. 
Thus, in the aftermath of Judge Weinstein‘s original announcement 
that the Zyprexa litigation was administered as a quasi-class action, 
Judge Weinstein issued no fewer than thirty-one additional orders re-
asserting that the Zyprexa litigation was a quasi-class action.  However, 
few of these opinions discuss what a quasi-class action is, the 
consequences of characterizing a litigation as a quasi-class action, or 
authority in support of this concept.  Instead, Judge Weinstein‘s 
voluminous orders dramatically illustrate the problem of computer-
generated boilerplate opinions that repeat formulaic, conclusory set 
pieces.  Hence, in at least twenty-five of his thirty-one Zyprexa 
decisions, Judge Weinstein pasted-and-glued the identical paragraph 
referring to the quasi-class action: 
The individual Zyprexa user litigation has been administered as a quasi-
class action.  See in re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 
262 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (―The court, magistrate judge and special masters 
will continue to administer this litigation as a quasi-class action.‖); In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(―Recognizing its obligation to exercise careful oversight of this national 
‗quasi class action,‘ the court has already realized its equitable power to 
limit attorneys‘ fees and costs.‖) (citation omitted); In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Lib. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that 
individual Zyprexa user litigation ―may be characterized properly as a 
quasi-class action subject to the general equitable power of the court‖); In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 




Clearly, this repeated reference to the quasi-class action is self-
referential and provides no doctrinal support for the concept.  
 
adjustments). 
 35. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. at 122. 
 36. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2009 WL 5062109 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 
2009) (considering Arizona‘s two-year statute of limitations on consumer products liability claim). 
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Moreover—and significantly in the numerous orders in which Judge 
Weinstein recites that Zyprexa was administered as a quasi-class action, 
that status had absolutely no implication at all for the issue adjudicated 
in the order.37  Despite Judge Weinstein‘s repeated reminder that the 
Zyprexa litigation was administered as a quasi-class action, this status 
had absolutely no effect on Judge Weinstein‘s ruling on an array of 
motions dealing with statute of limitations issues,38 summary 
judgment,39 remand,40 proximate causation,41 the learned intermediary 
 
 37. See id.; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting 
boilerplate of quasi-class action status; magistrate‘s discovery order in state attorney generals‘ litigation 
not clearly erroneous; MDL settlement warranted); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 
2009 WL 1173069, at app. A (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; 
order expanding authority of special master to include attorney generals of Idaho and Minnesota); In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action 
status; granting class certification to institutions and patients against pharmaceuticals manufacturer 
alleging overpayment on purchases of Zyprexa), rev’d, UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 
121 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 2696916 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 2, 2008) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; order in preparation for conference on 
motion for class action status in third-party payor litigation); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (referring to quasi-class action status as basis for limiting attorney 
fees; ordering that state Medicaid agencies pay share of attorney fees and costs in procuring settlement). 
 38. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-2592, 2009 WL 5062109 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009) (considering Arizona‘s two-year statute of limitations on consumer products 
liability claim); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2009 WL 5062114 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
10, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; order relating to claimant‘s time-bar under 
California statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596 (JBW), 2009 WL 
3597447 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; action barred by California‘s 
two-year statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596 (JBW), 2009 WL 
2485829 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; claimant‘s action 
barred by California statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2009 
WL 1850970 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; plaintiff barred 
by two-year statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2009 WL 
1851062 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; plaintiff‘s claim 
barred by Missouri‘s five-year statute of limitations). 
 39. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 688 F. Supp. 2d 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate 
of quasi-class action status; manufacturer defendant‘s motions to exclude proposed expert witness 
testimony and motion for summary judgment denied); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-
1596, 2009 WL 2245068 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; 
issue of material fact existed as to failure to warn; summary judgment denied); In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; 
defendant‘s motion for summary judgment and to exclude expert testimony denied). 
 40. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 1596, 2008 WL 2511791 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) 
(referencing quasi-class action status of litigation; denying motion to remand MDL cases to their 
original transferor courts); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (referring 
to quasi-class action nature of Zyprexa litigation; motion to remand two thousand pending cases to state 
court). 
 41. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate of 
quasi-class action status; applying Arizona law, manufacturer‘s warning not proximate cause of 
plaintiff‘s injuries); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-2798, 2009 WL 
2487305 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; administratrix failed 
to prove inadequate warning proximately caused decedent‘s diabetes); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 07-CV-4505 (JBW), 2009 WL 2004540 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2009) (reciting 
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defense,42 failure to warn,43 or other evidentiary issues.44  In short, Judge 
Weinstein‘s numerous references to the quasi-class action in his 
numerous Zyprexa opinions offer scant enlightenment on the quasi-class 
action construct, and had no effect on his rulings (except in the attorney 
fee context). 
C. Dubious Authority for a Dubious Doctrine 
Only a very small subset of Judge Weinstein‘s Zyprexa orders attempt 
to amplify a theory of the quasi-class action, as it relates to the attorney 
fee issue.45  In this handful of decisions, Judge Weinstein referred to the 
Zyprexa litigation variously as a ―non-class conglomerate settlement,‖46 
something analogous to the class action,47 and a ―structural class 
action.‖48  Yet Judge Weinstein acknowledged that the resolution of the 
 
boilerplateof quasi-class action status; failure to warn did not proximately cause claimant‘s injuries); In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2782 (JBW), 2009 WL 1851999 
(E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; no proximate causation); In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 07-CV-987 (JBW), 2009 WL 1514628 
(E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; no basis in West Virginia law 
no proximate cause upon which plaintiff could establish a failure-to-warn claim). 
 42. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2782 (JBW), 2009 WL 
3596982 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; consumer‘s claim 
barred by learned intermediary doctrine under California law); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 
04-MD-1596 (JBW), 04-CV-1612 (JBW), 2009 WL 3596526 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (reciting 
boilerplate of quasi-class action status; consumer‘s claim barred by learned intermediary doctrine); In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2592 (JBW), 2009 WL 2163118 
(E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; learned intermediary defense 
established). 
 43. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 07-CV-1161 (JBW), 2009 WL 
3597194 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; patient‘s estate 
failed to adduce evidence of failure to warn; manufacturer not liable for failure to warn); In re Zyprexa 
Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-1338 (JBW), 2009 WL 1404978 (E.D.N.Y. May 
19, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; drug manufacturer‘s failure to warn not cause 
of plaintiff‘s injuries). 
 44. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate 
of quasi-class action status; order denying Mississippi state‘s request to utilize aggregate proof of 
claims); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2782 (JBW), 2009 WL 
1852001 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; insufficient 
evidence to indicate drug caused plaintiff‘s injuries; drug manufacturer not liable); In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-1600 (JBW), 2009 WL 1514427 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 
2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; lack of evidence to establish causal connection 
between drug and plaintiff‘s diabetes). 
 45. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 
F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397. 
 46. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d at 262; see also id. at 269 (referring to the 
Zyprexa settlement as a ―conglomerate mass quasi-class action in the offing . . . .‖). 
 47. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491. 
 48. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (characterizing individual lawsuit 
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Zyprexa litigation was ―in the nature of a private agreement between 
individual plaintiffs and defendants.‖49 
Judge Weinstein, in one of his earliest Zyprexa decisions, described 
the central features of a quasi-class action.  Quasi-class actions, then, 
occur under the umbrella of MDL proceedings.  Within this MDL 
auspice, a quasi-class action is characterized in the following way: 
The large number of plaintiffs subject to the same settlement matrix 
approved by the court, the utilization of special masters approved by the 
court to control discovery and assist in and administer the settlement, and 
the order of the court for a huge escrow arrangement and other 
interventions by the court reflect a degree of control requiring the 
exercise by the court of fiduciary standards to ensure the fair treatment to 
all parties and counsel regarding fees.
50
 
In a half-dozen orders, Judge Weinstein cited various authoritative 
sources in support of his ability to supervise the award of attorney fees 
in the context of a private-party settlement, based on his theory that he is 
supervising a quasi-class action.  Judge Weinstein briefly cites four 
types of authority: (1) the ―general equitable powers of the court,‖51 (2) 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) precedential cases, and (4) the 
Class Action Fairness Act.  As will be discussed, none of these briefly 
referenced authorities in Judge Weinstein‘s various Zyprexa orders 
remotely authorized or legitimized the concept of the quasi-class action.  
In addition, Judge Weinstein also appealed to various broad policy 
rationales to justify his endorsement of the quasi-class action 
mechanism. 
Judge Weinstein‘s broadest invocation of authority for the quasi-class 
action is the ―general equitable powers of the court.‖52  Under the rubric 
of the ―general equitable powers of the court,‖ Judge Weinstein located 
a mandate to federal judges to creatively innovate in the supervision and 
administration of aggregate litigation.  Relying on no-less an 
authoritative body than the Federal Judicial Center, in a daisy-chain of 
logic, Judge Weinstein suggests: 
Recognizing the special difficulties presented by mass tort quasi-class 
actions, the federal Judicial Center has advised that ―[a]lthough the ‗just 
 
by the State of Mississippi as constituting a ―structural class action,‖ even though not pursued formally 
under Rule 23; ―Mississippi‘s suit is in the nature of a structural class action. The extensive case law 
regarding the uses and limitations of aggregative evidence in Rule 23 class action is applicable.‖). 
 49. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. at 122. 
 50. Id. at 122–23; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. at 540 (same); In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (same). 
 51. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. at 122; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting quasi class action subject to general equitable 
powers of the court). 
 52. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 271. 
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speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action‘ requirement 
applies to all cases, the difficult and sometimes contradictory demands 
posed by mass torts make case management both challenging and critical.  
The absence of precedent or of legislative rulemaking solutions should 
not foreclose innovation and creativity.  MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION, FOURTH § 22.1 (emphasis added).
53
 
Relying, then, on the FJC‘s Manual for Complex Litigation to supply 
content to the court‘s inherent power, Judge Weinstein concluded that 
when confronting the novel challenges of aggregate litigation, individual 
courts and judges are obligated to rely on the innovation and creativity 
allowed by their inherent equitable power.54  However, Judge 
Weinstein‘s references to the Manual for Complex Litigation as directly 
or indirectly supporting the quasi-class action seem dubious, at best; the 
Manual does not articulate, propose, endorse, or recognize the quasi-
class action, anywhere in its hundreds of pages. Indeed, it might come as 
a surprise to many federal judges that the FJC and its Manual for 
Complex Litigation endorse the quasi-class action. 
Judge Weinstein‘s second cluster of support for the quasi-class action 
is derived from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Ironically, many 
of the authorities Judge Weinstein cited rely on the class action rule 
itself: Rule 23(g), (h), and (e).55  Obviously, this is self-referential, 
tautological, and circular reasoning: Judge Weinstein would find support 
for the quasi-class action in the class action Rule 23 itself.  But Rule 23 
and the Advisory Committee Note nowhere speak of the concept of a 
quasi-class action, and Rule 23 does not by its terms provide support for 
broad assertions of judicial power in aggregate settlements outside the 
context of a certified class action.  Again, something either is a class 
action under Rule 23, or it is not; a conglomeration is not a class action 
or even something analogous to a class action, except perhaps, for size. 
In addition to citing Rule 23 as authority in support of the quasi-class 
action, Judge Weinstein also cites Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which mandates that federal courts should administer the 
rules to accomplish the ―just determination of every action.‖56  This is 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. Judge Weinstein also cites to the American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project: 
Appendix B, Reporter’s Study: A Model System for State to State Transfer and Consolidation, § 6, cmt. c 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, October 23, 1992).  While interesting as legislative history, citation to an ALI 
Tentative Draft has scant authoritative value. 
 55. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  Judge Weinstein 
cites Rule 23(g)(1)(C)(iii) (explaining judicial authority in appointing counsel to consider alternative 
possible fee proposals by competing applicants for appointment as class counsel); Rule 23(h) 
(explaining judicial authority to approve fee petitions in class actions); and Rule 23(e)(1)–(2) (dealing 
with judicial approval of proposed class action settlements); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Rule 23 provisions in support of quasi-class action). 
 56. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
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bootstrap authority; it is simply not plausible that Rule 1 broadly 
legitimizes private mass dispute resolution mechanisms under some 
pseudo-aura of judicial sanction such as the quasi-class action.  
Certainly the global asbestos class settlements in Amchem and Ortiz—
both accomplished under the formal requirements of Rule 23 and 
subsequently repudiated by the Supreme Court—were not therefore 
legitimized by Rule 1 simply because the settlements accomplished an 
efficient resolution of all asbestos claims.  Rule 1 embraces three core 
values: justice, expedition, and efficiency.  However, Rule 1 does not 
embrace efficiency and expedition to the exclusion of justice. 
The third type of authority that Judge Weinstein broadly cited 
included two class actions that he presided over as district judge: the 
New York asbestos litigation57 and the Agent Orange settlement.58  Yet 
both these cases are dubious support—actually provide no support at 
all—for the theory that a quasi-class action is a legitimate construct.  
Both cases were pursued under the formal class action rule, and the New 
York asbestos litigation ultimately was resolved under bankruptcy 
auspices.  All that these two cases represent is the proposition that 
judges in properly certified class actions may approve or disapprove 
attorney fee requests.  Neither decision has anything to do with the 
quasi-class action. 
Finally, Judge Weinstein cites the Class Action Fairness Act of 
200559 as providing additional support for the quasi-class action.60  He 
referred to a subsection in the newly created CAFA original jurisdiction 
provisions that authorize the removal of ―mass‖ actions to federal 
court.61  However, this CAFA provision has nothing to do with quasi-
class actions.  Of the fifty states, two do not have state class action 
rules.62  Consequently, actions instituted in those states that join large 
numbers of plaintiffs would not be subject to removal under CAFA.  To 
remedy this problem, Congress enacted a provision to provide 
defendants sued in these states to remove cases involving the mass 
 
 57. Id. (citing In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 784 
(E.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 58. Id. (citing In re Agent Orange Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1304–05 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
 59. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006) (concerning original diversity jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006) 
(concerning removal jurisdiction). 
 60. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491. 
 61. Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A)). 
 62. These states are Mississippi and Virginia.  Mississippi, at least, permits simple joinder of 
large numbers of plaintiffs in a single action, but does not recognize the class action mechanism.  Cf. In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (characterizing Mississippi‘s 
individual lawsuit in the Zyprexa litigation, seeking approval for use of classwide statistical aggregate 
evidence, as constituting a ―structural‖ class action congruent with other forms of aggregate litigation, 
insofar as the State sought to use generalized evidence to prove its claims). 
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joinder of claimants, and called these types of cases mass actions.  In so 
doing, Congress did not contemplate, create, or endorse the concept of a 
quasi-class action. 
In addition to the weak rule-based and precedential authority that 
Judge Weinstein conjured for his assertion of judicial power outside the 
confines of an appropriately constituted class action, he relied on dicta 
and policy rationales in support of his notion of the quasi-class action.  
For example, Judge Weinstein cited—with disapproval—the history of 
mass tort litigation as a narrative of judicial ineffectiveness in resolving 
mass torts.63  Thus, after citing Rule 23 as authority for his power to 
adjust attorney fees, Judge Weinstein next attacks Rule 23 jurisprudence 
as an obstacle to accomplishing resolution of mass litigation.  Judge 
Weinstein would have it both ways: he cited to Rule 23 both in support 
of his judicial powers,64 as well as an impediment to those powers. 
In particular, Judge Weinstein criticized the Supreme Court‘s 
decisions in Amchem65 and Ortiz,66 and the Second Circuit‘s decisions in 
Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.,67 as decisions that ―made total closure 
of possible future claims by class action more difficult.‖68  Considering 
these obstructionist Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions, Judge 
Weinstein discerns a trend and support for his new quasi-class action 
concept: 
As a result of the dubious benefits available from class actions in 
resolving mass disputes, particularly in pharmaceutical cases, more 
defendants have now begun to embrace a form of quasi-class action to 




In a subsequent Zyprexa order—invoking this same theme which 
criticizes the Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions—Judge 
 
 63. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (―It is well to 
reflect for a moment on the recent history of mass litigation generally.‖); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (manifesting concern for the fate of the 
pharmaceutical industry and public health considerations). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (characterizing individual 
lawsuit by the State of Mississippi as constituting a ―structural class action,‖ even though not pursued 
formally under Rule 23; ―Mississippi‘s suit is in the nature of a structural class action. The extensive 
case law regarding the uses and limitations of aggregative evidence in Rule 23 class action is 
applicable.‖). Thus, when Judge Weinstein desires to use Rule 23 or Rule 23 jurisprudence, he finds 
authority to do so by conjuring the litigation before him as some pseudo-class action. 
 65. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 66. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 67. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part vacated in part, 
Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). 
 68. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citing, for discussion purposes 
only, also to the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2006)). 
 69. Id. at 269–70. 
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Weinstein similarly suggests the following: 
This development [the Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions] has led 
a number of judges and attorneys, particularly in pharmaceutical cases, to 
attempt mass settlements on consolidated and cooperative basis without 
the formalities of a class action.  The substitute quasi-class action 
aggregate technique has advantages and is being closely studied.
70
 
Judge Weinstein‘s observation concerning the practicing bar‘s and the 
judiciary‘s embrace of private settlements as a preferred means for 
resolving aggregate liabilities, however, certainly does not provide 
authoritative legal support for the quasi-class action.  (Or, just because 
some people may be doing it, doesn‘t make it legitimate.)  In addition, 
apart from Judge Weinstein, there is scant record that ―a number‖ of 
judges have supervised private mass settlement deals outside the 
purview of the class action rule.71 
It is hardly surprising that Judge Weinstein would eschew the Second 
Circuit‘s Stephenson decision which in essence held that Judge 
Weinstein had failed to provide future claimants with adequate 
representation at the time of his approval of the Agent Orange 
settlement.72  But Judge Weinstein‘s repudiation of the Amchem, Ortiz, 
and Stephenson decisions manifests a tone-deaf dismissal of the 
fundamental importance of those cases.  Judge Weinstein rejected the 
Court‘s Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions because he perceived 
those decisions as limiting the usefulness of the class action rule to 
resolve mass litigation; collectively, these decisions—Judge Weinstein 
believed—bound his hands as a judge and frustrated his ability to 
achieve efficiency in resolving big cases.  These decisions were ill-
conceived, in his view, because they were impediments to judicial 
efforts to resolve mass cases.  In addition, these decisions were harmful 
to industry, and in the instance of pharmaceutical litigation, adverse to 
public health considerations.73 
 
 70. In re Zyprex Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing, for discussion 
purposes only, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Preliminary Draft No. 4,2006)). 
 71. See discussion of the Vioxx settlement, infra Part II.D; see also In re Guidant Corp. 
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05 1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *6 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (discussing court authority to supervise attorney fee award in private settlement of 
medical device mass action: ―Before this Court is a coordinated litigation of many individual yet related 
cases that effectively is, and proceeded as, a quasi-class action.‖).  Apart from the Zyprexa, Guidant, and 
Vioxx litigations, as of this writing the author could not find any other reported decision referring to a 
mass settlement resolved as a quasi-class action. 
 72. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part vacated in part, 
Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (4–4 decision) (noting future claimants not 
bound by class settlement of future claims due to lack of adequate representation at the time of the 
settlement; future claimants permitted to pursue collateral attack against the settlement). 
 73. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (―In addition, 
the viability of an effective pharmaceutical industry and public health considerations necessitate 
17
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In this same vein, Judge Weinstein drew further support for private 
settlements under the umbrella of the quasi-class action because he 
viewed the quasi-class action as an antidote to the perceived failure of 
past mass tort litigation: ―Most would agree that a reprise of the asbestos 
litigation with an almost uncontrolled search by plaintiffs‘ attorneys for 
new cases and new parties, ultimately exhausting the courts and 
bankrupting industries, ought not be encouraged.‖74 
However, the fundamental purpose of the Courts‘ reasoning in 
Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson was to strengthen the due process 
protections of absent class members by requiring heightened scrutiny of 
the Rule 23 adequacy-of-representation requirement, especially in the 
settlement context.  Judge Weinstein, then, would jettison the 
requirements of Rule 23 and the due process protections of absent class 
members, in favor of efficiency rationales.  Therefore, if Amchem, Ortiz, 
and Stephenson set the due process bar too high, Judge Weinstein 
approved circumventing these pesky decisions by allowing litigants to 
privately cut deals without the necessity to satisfy formal Rule 23 
requirements and its due process protections.  If Rule 23 is now a barrier 
to accomplishing aggregate settlements, Judge Weinstein would simply 
dispense with the rule, except when he needs the rule as buttressing 
support for his ability to exercise some judicial authority in a limited 
sphere of operation.75 
 
efficient and fair control by the courts of cases of this kind.‖). 
 74. In re Zyprex Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. at 541. 
 75. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(characterizing individual lawsuit by the State of Mississippi as constituting a ―structural class action,‖ 
even though not pursued formally under Rule 23; ―Mississippi‘s suit is in the nature of a structural class 
action. The extensive case law regarding the uses and limitations of aggregative evidence in Rule 23 
class action is applicable.‖). 
In fairness to Judge Weinstein, he does at least concede, in one of his Zyprexa orders, that 
―Avoiding formal Rule 23 class actions presents serious pitfalls.‖ See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
238 F.R.D. at 541. Judge Weinstein notes: 
One is the possibility that new cases, and attorneys, will be attracted to the honey pot of 
litigation after all, or almost all, of the well-founded cases have been disposed of. Only the Rule 
23 class action can provide full closure in many litigations.  Id. 
However, after acknowledging that Rule 23 has its virtues, Judge Weinstein nonetheless defaults to 
his preferred position, which favors private settlement of mass litigation under the auspices of MDL 
proceedings. 
Again, in one of his earliest decisions discussing the quasi-class action, Judge Weinstein 
acknowledges that many of the concerns about the protection of class members should apply with equal 
force to aggregate settlements achieved in a non-class format. Thus, Judge Weinstein writes: 
Many of the same considerations that necessitate close judicial supervision of plaintiffs‘ counsel 
and proposed settlements in the class action context―such as protecting absent class or 
disinterested litigants, and dealing with plaintiffs‘ practical inability to monitor their attorneys, 
some of whom represent hundreds of clients within the same litigation―apply to quasi-class 
actions such as the instant one. Some of the conventions required when a class is certified are 
appropriate in quasi-class actions involving large aggregations of claims. In both contexts, the 
primary goal of the court is to ―ensure that similarly situated individuals receive equal fairness 
18
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D. The Vioxx Litigation: Exploitation and Expansion of the Quasi-Class 
Action 
The resolution of the Vioxx litigation illustrates how judicial 
deployment of the quasi-class action concept has been expanded beyond 
judicial authority to adjust attorney fees to adversely affect the rights of 
unrepresented or under-represented persons with an interest in the 
litigation.  As will be discussed below, the Vioxx litigation has inspired 
the first wholesale attack against the concept of the quasi-class action, 
with an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.76 
Merck Co. manufactured, marketed, and distributed Vioxx, a drug 
designed to relieve pain from osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, 
menstrual pain, and migraine headaches.77  The Food and Drug 
Administration approved Vioxx for sale in the United States on May 20, 
1999.  Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in September 2004, after 
the results of a clinical trial indicated that use of Vioxx increased the 
risks of cardiovascular thrombotic events such as myocardial infarction 
(heart attack) and ischemic stroke.  Between 1999 and 2004, it was 
estimated that physicians wrote nearly 105 million prescriptions for 
Vioxx, and that an estimated twenty million patients had taken the 
drug.78 
Thousands of individual and class action suits against Merck were 
filed in state and federal courts alleging products liability, tort, fraud, 
and breach of warranty claims.  On February 16, 2005, the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation created a Vioxx MDL and transferred 
all federal cases to the Eastern District of Louisiana.79  Between 
February 2005 and 2006, the court engaged in MDL coordinated pre-
trial proceedings, including the appointment of plaintiff and defendant 
steering committees.  In November 2006, the presiding Judge Eldon 
 
protections regardless of how the courts aggregated the litigation.‖  L. Elizabeth Chamblee, 
Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Tort claims Creates Second-Class 
Settlements, 65 La. L. Rev. 157, 241 (2004).  In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 
at 272. 
However, Judge Weinstein‘s initial recognition of the need for Rule 23 constraints in the context of 
quasi-class action settlements does not re-appear in his numerous subsequent citations to the quasi-class 
action. 
 76. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2010 U.S. Briefs 666 
(Nov. 17, 2010) (No. 10-666); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Glenn L. Dier v. Merck Sharp & Dohme 
Corp., 2010 U.S. Briefs 666 (Jan. 21, 2011) (No. 10-666). The Court denied the petition for certiorari on 
February 22, 2011.  See Dier v. Merck & Co. Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011). 
 77. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. 2009) (addressing motion 
for reconsideration of attorney fee cap on contingent fee arrangements). 
 78. Id. at 551. A more detailed factual background to the Vioxx litigation, before creation of the 
Vioxx MDL, is at In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 656 (E.D. La. 2005) (resolving 
Daubert challenges to various expert witnesses). 
 79. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (creating Vioxx MDL). 
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Fallon denied class certification of a nationwide class because the 
plaintiffs‘ claims raised choice-of-law problems and numerous 
individualized questions of fact.80  After denial of class certification, 
however, the court conducted six bellwether trials.81  As a consequence 
of the bellwether trials, the parties entered in settlement negotiations and 
on November 9, 2007, Merck announced a settlement of the Vioxx 
claims.82 
The Vioxx settlement was a private settlement agreement.  It 
established a pre-funded program in the amount of $4.85 billion dollars 
for resolving pending or tolled federal and state claims against Merck as 
of the date of the settlement.  The settlement provided compensation for 
claims of heart attack, ischemic stroke, and sudden cardiac death.  The 
settlement agreement provided for claimants to opt-in to the fund. 
The opt-in mechanism set forth threshold criteria for eligibility to opt-
in to the settlement.  In addition, the settlement imposed a requirement 
that any plaintiffs‘ counsel enrolling clients in the Master Settlement 
Agreement had to affirm that the attorney had recommended to 100% of 
the attorney‘s clients that they must accept the terms of the agreement, 
or the attorney must attempt to withdraw from representing clients who 
refused to accept the settlement terms.83 
The settlement agreement also gave the court continuing authority to 
oversee various aspects concerning implementation of the settlement, 
including the appointment of a fee allocation committee, allocating a 
percentage of the settlement proceeds to a common benefit fund, and 
modifying any provisions of the settlement agreement that were 
otherwise unenforceable.84  The MDL court also asserted its ―inherent 
authority over the multidistrict litigation‖ to ensure that ―the settlement 
proceedings move[d] forward in a uniform and efficient manner.‖85 
Merck retained the right to walk away from the settlement if certain 
conditions were not satisfied.86  In July of 2008, Merck announced that 
 
 80. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 458–59, 461 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 81. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 552.  During this same period, thirteen 
additional cases were tried in state courts in Texas, New Jersey, California, Alabama, Illinois, and 
Florida.  Id. 
 82. See Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 
2007), available at http://www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement. 
 83. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-30446, 388 Fed. App‘x 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom., Dier v. Merck & Co., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011). 
 84. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 552–53; see also In re Vioxx Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 08-1633, 2008 WL 3285912 (E.D. La. Aug. 7, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Avmed Inc. v. 
BrownGreer PLC., 300 Fed. App‘x 261 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 85. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 553; see also Pretrial Order No. 32, In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (2007) (No. 04-MD-1657) (memorializing the court‘s inherent authority over 
the multidistrict litigation to appoint a fee allocation committee). 
 86. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 553.  
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it was satisfied that the thresholds necessary to trigger funding of the 
Vioxx program had been fulfilled, that Merck would waive its walk-
away privilege, and that it would begin funding the program.87  On 
August 20, 2008, the claims administrator reported to the court that it 
had successfully reviewed claims from approximately 2,750 claims for 
interim payments.  At this point, the court issued an order capping 
plaintiffs‘ contingent fee arrangements at 32%.88 
Similar to events in the Zyprexa litigation, the Vioxx MDL Court‘s 
decision to cap the contingent fee arrangements caused a consortium of 
plaintiffs‘ lawyers—the Vioxx Litigation Consortium (VCL)—to 
challenge that decision.89  The VCL challenged the court‘s authority to 
adjust legal fees by arguing that classifying an MDL as a quasi-class 
action was inappropriate.90  The VCL pointed out that the underlying 
actions in an MDL remain individual in nature, while a class action is a 
representative proceeding.91  For this reason, the VCL contended, fee 
capping was appropriate in a class action but not in an MDL 
proceeding.92 
The court responded by indicating that it was true that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provided that district courts may 
require reasonable fees in class actions, while the MDL statute lacked an 
analogous provision.93  But, relying on both the Zyprexa and Guidant 
cases, the Louisiana court held that the Vioxx settlement could ―properly 
be analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the Court 
equitable authority to review contingent fee contracts for 
reasonableness.‖94  The court noted that the global settlement in the 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 558. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (comparing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii), and FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h), with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407).  
 94. Id. at 553–54, 558–59.  Taking a page from Judge Weinstein‘s playbook, the Louisiana 
federal court located its authority to oversee attorney fee arrangements in the quasi-class action, in 
various provisions of Rule 23 as well as the FJC‘s Manual for Complex Litigation.  Thus, the Court 
opined: 
First, any court presiding over a mass tort proceeding possesses equitable authority to examine 
fee arrangements.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly grant this power to district 
courts in class actions.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.927 (2004).  While and MDL is distinct 
from a class action, the substantial similarities between the two warrant the treatment of an MDL 
as a quasi-class action.  Order & Reasons, August 27, 2008, Rec. Doc. 15722, 8–9 (Aug. 27, 
2008).  Accordingly, this Court found that ―the Vioxx global settlement may be properly 
analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the Court equitable authority to review 
contingent fee contracts for reasonableness.‖  Id. at 9; see also In re Guidant Corp. Implantable 
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Vioxx litigation bore a significant resemblance to the Zyprexa global 
settlement.95  Comparing the two litigations, the court concluded that 
―[g]iven these similarities, and § 1407‘s mandate of just and efficient 
treatment, it is correct to consider the MDL as a quasi-class action.‖96  
Furthermore, in assessing the boundaries of its authority under the 
private settlement agreement, the court further noted that the parties had 
given the court express authority to modify any provision under certain 
circumstances.97 
E. The Dier Attack Against the Vioxx Quasi-Class Action 
Although the VCL asserted an unsuccessful objection to the district 
court‘s authority to modify fee arrangements, another group of Vioxx 
plaintiffs who had not opted-in to the settlement subsequently mounted a 
different challenge to the court‘s continuing authority over this quasi-
class action.98  The Master Settlement Agreement designated Judge 
Fallon as its chief administrator.99  In this capacity, Judge Fallon entered 
several pre-trial orders in November 2007 with respect to the claims of 
those plaintiffs who could not or chose not to participate in the Master 
Settlement Agreement (the non-settling plaintiffs). 
In particular, Judge Fallon issued pre-trial order 28 (PTO 28)100 that 
required non-settling plaintiffs to notify their healthcare providers that 
they must preserve evidence pertaining the plaintiffs‘ use of Vioxx.101  
In addition, these plaintiffs were also required to produce pharmacy 
records and medical authorizations, answers to interrogatories, and a 
Rule 26(a) report from a medical expert attesting that the plaintiff had 
sustained an injury caused by Vioxx and that they injury occurred within 
a specified period.102  If a non-settling plaintiff failed to comply with 
 
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *18 (D. Minn. March 
7, 2008) (relying on the quasi-class action nature of an MDL proceeding and the court‘s 
equitable authority to implement a reasonable cap on contingent fees); In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (exercising the court‘s inherent power to 
―impos[e] . . . fiduciary standards to ensure fair treatment to all parties and counsel regarding 
fees and expenses.‖).  Id. 
 95. Id., 650 F. Supp. at 559. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 554. 
 98. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-30446, 388 Fed. App‘x 391, 2010 WL 2802352 (5th 
Cir. July 16, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Dier v. Merck & Co., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011). 
 99. Id. at 393. 
 100. Id.  PTO 28 is characterized as a ―Lone Pine‖ order.  See id.; 388 Fed. App‘x at 393 n.1. 
(describing Lone Pine orders). 
 101. Id. at 393–94.  The court issued several other pre-trial orders; see description of PTOs 30 and 
31. 
 102. Id. at 394. 
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these requirements, the court could dismiss the plaintiffs‘ claims with 
prejudice.103 
Various non-settling Vioxx plaintiffs brought challenges to PTO 28, 
which Judge Fallon dismissed.104  In November 2008, Merck moved for 
a show-cause order relating to sixty-one non-settling plaintiffs for their 
failure to provide a case-specific expert report required by PTO 28, and 
in December 2008 Judge Fallon issued this show cause order.  In April 
2009, Judge Fallon dismissed certain plaintiffs‘ complaints (the Dier 
plaintiffs) with prejudice for failure to comply with PTO 28.105 
The Dier plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their cases to the Fifth 
Circuit, challenging the validity of the Master Settlement Agreement, 
Judge Fallon‘s lack of impartiality, and PTO 28.106  In a brief, 
unpublished decision issued July 16, 2010, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
Dier plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Master Settlement 
Agreement, and denied all the other challenges to the dismissal of their 
cases.107 
In November 2010, the Dier plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certorari to review the Fifth Circuit‘s decision.  In this 
appeal, the Dier plaintiffs perfected an attack against the authority of the 
district court to enter PTOs against the non-settling plaintiffs under the 
umbrella of a quasi-class action.  The concept of the quasi-class action 
was attacked not for the court‘s authority to adjust attorney fees, but the 
judiciary‘s expansive, continuing authority over a settlement to modify 
the rights of claimants.  The Dier plaintiffs squarely focused on the 
court‘s authority derived from the concept of a quasi-class action, 
framing the issue as follows: 
Can a transferee court use its authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to 
invoke the judicially-created ―quasi-class action‖ doctrine to preside over 
a mass settlement involving thousands of widely divergent personal 
injury claims and permit such a settlement to be approved outside the 
strictures of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without 
contravening Article III and depriving individual litigants of their rights 
guaranteed by the due process and right to trial by jury clauses of the 




 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  The non-settling Vioxx plaintiffs also brought challenges to subsequent orders by Judge 
Fallon ordering the non-settling plaintiffs to appear in person at various conferences held around the 
country.  For a description of these orders, see id. at 395.  Judge Fallon similarly denied challenges to 
these orders. 
 105. Id.  Dier maintained that they were in substantial compliance with PTO 28 and that New 
York law required only general causation proof. 
 106. Id. at 395–97. 
 107. Id. at 395, 397–98. 
 108. See Petition for Writ of Ceriorari, In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2010 U.S. Briefs 666 
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Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in February 2011,109 
the Dier plaintiffs‘ challenge to the quasi-class action sets forth the 
constitutional, statutory, rule-based, and precedential grounds for 
repudiating this construct.  As such, the Dier petition comprehensively 
set forth the array of arguments against the legitimacy of judicial 
authority invoked under the umbrella of a quasi-class action. 
Thus, the judicially created quasi-class action contravenes Article III 
of the Constitution, deprives litigants of their due process and jury trial 
rights, violates the Rules Enabling Act,110 impermissibly expands the 
scope of judicial authority under the multidistrict litigation statute, and 
does an end-run around the requirements of the class action Rule 23.  
Moreover, private settlement agreements consummated as quasi-class 
actions may, if unchecked, violate the spirit if not the letter of the 
court‘s Amchem and Ortiz decisions. 
The nub of the Dier plaintiffs‘ argument was that courts now 
illegitimately employ the multidistrict litigation procedure to create and 
approve class action settlements outside the scope of Rule 23.  The Dier 
plaintiffs objected to Judge Fallon‘s view there is a judicial trend 
towards recognizing the quasi-class action, and that class actions may 
morph into multidistrict litigation.111  This trend, they objected, not only 
impermissibly intruded upon legislative prerogatives, ―but runs 
roughshod over constitutional rights of individual litigants . . . who 
‗morph‘ from absent class members into ‗non-settling plaintiffs‘ by 
judicial override of Rule 23.‖112 
Thus, the Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement established a 
nationwide administrative claims regime similar to the nationwide class 
action settlements in Amchem and Ortiz, but contrary to the court‘s 
opinions repudiating those settlements, ―the managerial authority 
conferred upon multidistrict courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is 
being used to create class settlements outside Rule 23. . . ‖113  The Dier 
plaintiffs argued that in the past decade federal judges have made an 
end-run around Rule 23 ―by impermissibly expanding the limited 
reservoir of authority conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and sought to 
provide doctrinal basis for avoiding their fiduciary duties to absent class 
 
(Nov. 17, 2010) (No. 10-666) [hereinafter Petition]. 
 109. See Dier v.  Merck & Co. Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011). 
 110. Petition at *35–37.  The Rules Enabling Act provides that rules of procedure ―shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.‖  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  In essence, the Dier 
plaintiffs contend that settlement outside the purview of Rule 23 requirements, under the umbrella of the 
quasi-class action, is ―bottomed on the view that the day in court principle has gone the way of the dodo 
bird.‖  Id. at *37. 
 111. Id. at *19–20. 
 112. Id. at *20. 
 113. Id. at *19. 
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members by creating a quasi-class action.‖114 
Pointing to the district court‘s denial of certification of a nationwide 
Vioxx class action, the Dier plaintiffs contended that the settling parties 
in Vioxx consummated a private agreement that they could not have 
accomplished under the requirements of Rule 23.115  In so doing, the 
settling parties were able to negotiate a deal that circumvented the 
court‘s concerns about, and requirements for, global class action 
settlements articulated in Amchem and Ortiz.116  For the Dier plaintiffs, 
the use of the quasi-class action rationale to empower Judge Fallon to 
dismiss their cases for non-compliance with the PTO 28 ―breathe[d] real 
meaning into the concerns this Court observed in both Amchem and 
Ortiz and especially its conclusion that settlement classes require 
‗heightened attention.‘‖117  The Dier plaintiffs argued: ―The importance 
of the issue raised . . . is that, absent this Court putting a halt to the trend 
[of using the quasi-class action], the federal courts will be able to create 
de facto class actions at will outside the strictures of Rule 23.‖118 
The Dier plaintiffs objected to the negotiation and consummation of 
the Vioxx deal not subject to Rule 23 requirements, precisely because in 
its view Merck, as a wealthy defendant, accomplished a favorable 
sweetheart deal to the detriment of absent class members.119  In addition, 
under the umbrella of the quasi-class action, Merck engineered as part of 
the agreement the requirement for the subsequent discovery orders 
against non-opt-in plaintiffs, with the punitive dismissal of claims for 
non-compliance.120 
 
 114. Id. at *20.  The Dier plaintiffs also cited Judge Alex Kozinski as having identified a similar 
trend, characterizing this as ―a remarkable power grab by federal judges who have parleyed a narrow 
grant of authority to conduct consolidated discovery into a mechanism for systematically denying 
plaintiffs the right to a trial in the forum of their choice.‖  Id. at *26 (citing In re: Am, Cont‘l 
Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig. Lexecon, Inc., 102 F.3d 1524, 1540 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, 
C.J., dissenting)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *21. 
 117. Id. at *30. 
 118. Id. at *22–23; see also id. at *36 (citing Charles Silver and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-
Class Action Method of managing Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 107, 111 (2010)) (―By managing MDLs as they have, judges have compromised their 
independence, created unnecessary conflicts of interest, ridden roughshod over attorneys, turned a blind 
eye to questionable behavior, and weakened plaintiff lawyers‘ incentives to faithfully serve their 
clients.‖). 
 119. Id. at *23.  The Dier plaintiffs objected: ―The practical effect may be seen in the instant 
litigation in that it empowers defendants, who are inevitably large-scale corporations, to use their wealth 
and resources to dictate the terms of the settlement.‖ 
 120. Id. at *24–25 (―Indeed, in Amchem this Court instructed the safeguards provided for by rule 
(a) and (b) were set for the protection of absent class members and serve to ‗inhibit appraisals of the 
chancellor‘s foot kind‘ at 521 U.S. 621 . . . .  Since there is precious little in the record which permits 
any substantive review of the settlement achieved below, the result obtained permits the inference that 
the power of the purse had an influence in letting a wealthy defendant get out cheap.‖). 
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Furthermore, because the Vioxx deal was negotiated and 
consummated free from Rule 23 constraints, the district court was 
―hampered by both lack of adversarial presentation on the one hand and 
hydraulics of moving a large-scale settlement such as the one at bar.‖121  
The fact that private settlements may be accomplished apart from class 
action requirements affected the rights of persons not wishing to agree: 
―These machinations virtually guarantee one or another legal doctrine 
will be invoked to dispose of recalcitrants without reaching the merits of 
their claims.‖122 
Finally, the Dier plaintiffs additionally noted the thin doctrinal basis 
for the concept of the quasi-class action, suggesting that Judge 
Weinstein in the Zyprexa decisions did nothing more than describe the 
characteristics of an MDL and then ―baldly assert they provided the 
foundation for the doctrine of quasi-class action.‖123  Tracing the 
evolution of Judge Weinstein‘s jurisprudential philosophy relating to the 
resolution of mass tort litigation, the Dier plaintiffs pointed out that 
Judge Weinstein consistently believed that due process must be 
subordinated to the public interest implicated in the resolution of mass 
tort litigation.124  Moreover, the Dier plaintiffs challenged Judge 
Weinstein‘s suggestion that the Class Action Fairness Act provided 
additional support for the judicial embrace of the concept of the quasi-
class action.125 
*  * * 
As indicated above, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to 
the Dier plaintiffs‘ appeal, thus avoiding consideration of the legitimacy 
of the quasi-class action question raised by these plaintiffs.  Moreover, 
Merck‘s response to the certiorari petition largely ignored the core issue 
relating to the quasi-class action.  Instead, Merck simply argued that the 
Fifth Circuit correctly determined that the Dier plaintiffs lacked 
 
 121. Id. at *28. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at *38. 
 124. Id. at *39–40. 
 125. Id. at *40–41 (citing Judge Young: ―It is precisely because MDL practice is perceived so 
clearly to favor the defense that Congress appears to have lost confidence in a judicial management 
mechanism that once had such great promise.  The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), itself thought to be legislation that favors business defendants, see Natale v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164–68 (D. Mass. 2005), contains an unmistakable rebuke to the Panel on 
Multi-District Litigation in Section 4, which provides that no class action removed to federal court under 
its provisions shall thereafter be transferred to another district pursuant to Title 28, Section 1407(a) of 
the U.S. Code without the request of the majority of plaintiffs.[]  See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 11-
12 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i)).‖). 
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standing to challenge the agreement.126  While cabining its arguments 
chiefly to the standing issue, Merck nonetheless argued that the district 
court acted well within its broad discretion to manage multidistrict 
proceedings when it entered and enforced its pretrial orders.127 
In response to the Dier plaintiffs, Merck contended that the lower 
court decisions did not conflict with the Court‘s holdings in Amchem 
and Ortiz, because Amchem and Ortiz involved class settlements.128  The 
Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement, Merck argued, did not present the 
dangers that the Court identified in Amchem and Ortiz because the MSA 
was never viewed as a ―class settlement.‖129  Moreover, the MSA was 
not a de facto class action settlement.  Thus, the risks presented by class 
settlements were not germane to the Vioxx deal because the agreement 
was binding only on individuals who affirmatively opted-in to the 
agreement.130 
In addition, the district court had not abused its discretion in entering 
the pre-trial orders—especially PTOs 28 and 29—because district courts 
have wide discretion to manage discovery in proceedings before 
them.131  A district court‘s discretion to manage complex multidistrict 
proceedings, Merck argued, includes the power to issue so-called Lone 
Pine orders,132 as well as to order dismissal of claims as a sanction for 
non-compliance with a trial court‘s orders.133 
In sum, Merck declined to directly address the Dier plaintiffs‘ 
objections to the court‘s use of the quasi-class action.  Instead, Merck 
contended that the Vioxx agreement was simply not a class action, and 
therefore outside the purview of class action jurisprudence.  By evading 
the quasi-class action issue, Merck offered no further analysis, 
justification, or rationales supporting the court‘s invocation of the 
doctrine.  Thus, while the Dier plaintiff‘s certiorari petition offers a 
detailed roadmap for a future challenge to the quasi-class action, 
Merck‘s opposition does not afford a similar array of supporting 
arguments.  Instead, Merck‘s opposition to the certiorari petition left 
defense of the legitimacy of the quasi-class action to some other 
 
 126. Brief in Opposition at 1, Dier v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (Jan. 21, 
2011) (No. 10-666) (noting that every court that has considered the question has held that non-settling 
parties, even parties who opt out of class settlements, lack standing to challenge a private agreement 
between parties) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition]. 
 127. Id. at 14, 23–27. 
 128. Id. at 15. 
 129. Id. (noting, ironically, that the district court expressly considered and denied class 
certification in the underlying litigation). 
 130. Id. at 16. 
 131. Id. at 24. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 25. 
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litigators in some other future action. 
II. THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
As indicated at the outset of this Article, there is no such thing as a 
quasi-class action and the judiciary ought to reject this doctrine as an 
illegitimate expansion of judicial authority and a usurpation of the rule 
of law.  Once individuals have retained counsel and are represented to 
pursue legal redress—especially in complex, aggregate litigation—
courts undertake a fiduciary role to protect the interests of all claimants, 
and not to subvert the interests of some.  Therefore, courts should not 
become complicit in providing an aura of judicial authority, through 
invocation of the quasi-class action, to sanctify private backroom deals 
negotiated and consummated to the advantage of some, but to the 
detriment of others. 
The concept of the quasi-class action is the very antithesis of the class 
action.  Instead, the concept cloaks a federal judge with an aura of 
authority to do whatever the judge desires, and outside the formal 
requirements of Rule 23 or class action jurisprudence.  This leaves both 
plaintiff and defense attorneys involved in complex cases at liberty to 
privately arrange solutions to their own advantage, also free from the 
constraints of the class action rule.  The quasi-class action is not 
authorized by Rule 23, the Class Action Fairness Act, or some 
expansive interpretation of the multi-district litigation statute, as is 
discussed below. 
Furthermore, the quasi-class action is not legitimized by any crisis 
mentality inspired by complex cases on the federal docket, or arguments 
derived from judicial efficiency and economy.  Numerous federal courts 
agree—and it is fundamental principle of class action jurisprudence—
that the value of judicial efficiency can never be invoked to supersede 
the interests of justice and fairness. 
A. Rule 23 Does Not Authorize or Rationalize the Quasi-Class Action by 
Analogy 
The federal class action rule historically has been centrally concerned 
with providing due process protections to individuals involved in 
aggregate litigation.  The quasi-class action is an oxymoron: the label 
provides no formal or informal protections to individuals involved in 
aggregate litigation.  Instead, the quasi-class action supplies pseudo-
legitimacy for those who wish to manipulate aggregate deals outside the 
rule of law, but under the guise of judicial legitimacy. 
The quasi-class action offends the very understanding of the class 
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action.  The core concept underlying the class action rule is that it is 
representative litigation; claimants in the class are not actually present in 
the litigation to represent their own interests, as they would be if the 
individual were involved in a simple, bipolar litigation.  Thus, Rule 23 
and the considerable class jurisprudence developed under the rule sets 
forth numerous due process protections for absent class members.  
These due process protections are derived from the fact that class action 
judgments are binding on all members of a class, and that fairness 
dictates that before an absent claimant may be bound to a judgment, that 
individual must be adequately represented by those pursuing the 
litigation.134 
Perhaps the most significant difference between ordinary litigation 
and class litigation is the imposition or intercession of a judicial officer, 
at the very outset of the litigation, to manage and oversee the litigation.  
This is not excessive formalism or hoop-jumping; the purpose is to 
ensure the protection of individuals not present to represent themselves. 
Rule 23 sets forth detailed requirements, many of which are directed 
at ensuring the due process protections of absent class members.  For 
example, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a court make a finding that 
proposed class representatives are adequate to represent persons not 
actually present to protect their own interests.135  The adequacy 
requirement is to ensure that the class representatives are knowledgeable 
about the litigation, understand the nature of the claims and defenses, 
the scope of the class they are representing, and that they are free from 
conflicts of interest. 
Adequate class representatives are necessary from the outset of class 
litigation to serve as independent fiduciaries protecting the interests of 
absent class members against possible self-dealing by class counsel and 
their adversaries.  Adequate class representatives serve as an 
independent bulwark against potentially collusive settlement agreements 
negotiated by interested parties, to the advantage of some and the 
disadvantage of others.  Adequate class representatives provide a 
safeguard against potentially deleterious reverse auction settlements 
whereby defense counsel seeks out the weakest class counsel with 
whom to negotiate discounted settlements. 
In tandem with the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement for adequate class 
representatives, Rule 23(g) provides for judicial appointment of class 
counsel.136  Judicial appointment of class counsel, at the outset of class 
action litigation, is another way in which the judicial system protects the 
interests of absent class members.  Thus, pursuant to Rule 23(g), a court 
 
 134. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
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must evaluate proposed candidates to represent the class, examining 
counsel‘s experience, resources, and potential conflicts of interest, 
among other factors.137  In addition, if more than one attorney seeks 
appointment as class counsel, a court must comparatively evaluate 
among competing candidates to represent the class.138 
Courts afford potential class members additional due process 
protections through other requirements of Rule 23.  For example, no 
aggregate litigation may proceed as a class action unless the court 
certifies that the proposed action satisfies all the requirements of Rule 
23(a),139 and may be maintained as a class pursuant to one of the 
categories of Rule 23(b).140  The early certification of a class ensures 
that there is sufficient cohesion of interest among class members to 
permit their claims to be resolved on an aggregate basis.141  If a court 
certifies a damage class action under Rule 23(b)(3), then class members 
must be afforded notice and an opportunity to opt out, among other 
rights.142 
One of the most important due process protections afforded by the 
class action rule is the requirement of judicial approval of any class 
action settlement.143  Since 2003, Rule 23(e) now requires that judges 
conduct a formal ―fairness hearing‖ prior to approving a class action 
settlement.  At a fairness hearing, the court must finally certify the class; 
evaluate the settlement to determine if it is fair, adequate, and 
reasonable; and consider fee petitions of class counsel.  The court must 
evaluate the settlement for both procedural and substantive fairness.  In 
this fashion, the court serves as the ultimate fiduciary and guardian of 
the interests of absent class members. 
Aggregate litigation conducted under the umbrella of multidistrict 
litigation, but outside the requirements and protections of the class 
action rule, affords individuals who are involved in an aggregate 
litigation none of these protections.  Indeed, as the Vioxx litigation 
demonstrated, it is entirely possible for a court supervising a 
multidistrict litigation to determine that a proposed class action is not 
 
 137. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1). 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2). 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).  These are the requirements that the proposed class satisfy 
requisite numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3). 
 141. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997) (discussing sufficient cohesion 
among class members to proceed as a class action). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).  Since 2003, the rule also permits judges, in their discretion to order 
that notice be provided in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes.  However, the 2003 amendment to Rule 23 
does not permit class members to opt-out of these mandatory classes.  Notice to absent class members 
also must indicate that class members have the right to appear in the action with their own counsel, if 
they choose. 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
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suitable for class action treatment, but then for the attorneys to go off 
and cut a deal without regard for the requirements of class action 
litigation.  For attorneys (on both sides of the docket) who wish to evade 
the strict requirements for resolving aggregate litigation, the quasi-class 
action is a wonderful construct, providing judicial cover without the 
burdens, roadblocks, and entanglements of due process. 
B. The Quasi-Class Action as a End-Run Solution Around the Class 
Action Rule and Class Action Jurisprudence—The Evolution of the 
Concept 
The emergence of the quasi-class action represents the logical 
convergence of two class action trends over the past three decades.  This 
narrative embodies the increasing frustrations of the plaintiff and 
defense bar, as well as the judiciary, in resolving aggregate litigation.  
Against the backdrop of increasing impediments to settling aggregate 
claims, the actors involved in complex litigation have arrived at the 
quasi-class action as a favorable conceit to resolve massive litigation, 
favorable to all except perhaps the claimants involved in the litigation.  
As will be discussed below, the ascendancy of the MDL auspices has 
effectively freed the actors involved in aggregate litigation from most 
legal constraints, allowing parties to go off and negotiate deals liberated 
from the rule of law. 
In order to comprehend how the quasi-class action has provided an 
ingenious construct that enables aggregate settlements, it is important to 
understand why the various actors involved in complex litigation have 
welcomed this concept.  In the past thirty years, federal courts have 
heightened requirements for certification of litigation classes, and more 
stringently articulated the rigorous analysis standard for class 
certification.144  After a brief period of experimentation with innovative 
multi-phase class action trial plans,145 federal courts in 1995–1996 
reacted by issuing a series of landmark decisions that rejected 
certification of litigation classes, especially in mass tort litigation 
arena.146 
 
 144. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Products Liab. Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009); In re 
IPO Sec. Fraud Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) (clarifying standards that courts must apply in 
conducting a rigorous analysis in order to grant class certification). 
 145. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding class 
certification of torture and death victims of Ferdinand Marcos regime; multi-phase trial plan including 
statistical damage sampling); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving 
three phase trial plan, trying state of the art defense and liability for punitive damages in first phase). 
 146. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing class 
certification of a nationwide class of persons addicted to tobacco products); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 
75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing class certification of a nationwide class of penile implant 
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The series of judicial decisions in the mid-1990s that tightened class 
certification requirements seriously affected the plaintiffs‘ bar‘s ability 
to pursue class litigation in federal court.  The plaintiffs‘ bar reacted by 
regrouping and retreating—many attorneys determined to avoid federal 
courts altogether, and instead to pursue class litigation in state courts.  
This retreat to state courts ushered in a decade of rapidly expanding state 
court class action litigation, accompanied by forum-shopping for 
favorable venues and the emergence of so-called ―judicial hell-holes,‖ 
so labeled because of the propensity of certain state courts to provide 
quick and easy class certification on the pleadings alone. 
The ascendance of state court class litigation and easy class 
certification there precipitated its own backlash, which eventually 
resulted in efforts by the corporate defense bar to enact the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005.147  CAFA provided a mechanism for corporate 
defendants to remove state class actions to federal court, where 
defendants could rely on the body of restrictive federal class action 
jurisprudence to defeat proposed class certification.148 CAFA‘s 
legislative history clearly suggests that the legislative purpose in 
enacting CAFA was to provide corporate defendants with an alternative 
forum to—and some relief from—state court venues that unfairly 
favored class action plaintiffs. 
In the same period that federal courts began to tighten the 
requirements for certification of litigation classes, federal courts also 
embarked on an examination of the concept of the settlement class.149  
The debate over the viability and criteria for settlement classes 
ultimately culminated in the Supreme Court‘s dual decisions in Amchem 
in 1997150 and Ortiz in 1999.151  As is well-known, although the 
Supreme Court upheld the concept of a settlement class, the Court 
rejected the Amchem and Ortiz global asbestos settlement agreements 
that the district courts had approved in those two litigations.  The 
Court‘s Amchem decision set forth important due process requirements 
(and constraints) on Rule 23(b)(3) settlement classes,152 while the 
Court‘s Ortiz decision likewise set forth three important criteria for Rule 
 
claimants); In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing class 
certification of a nationwide class of hemophiliacs in the so-called ―tainted blood products‖ litigation). 
 147. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
 148. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006) (concerning CAFA removal provision). 
 149. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 
133 (3d Cir. 1995) (examining the concept of a ―settlement class‖ and setting forth requirements for 
court approval of a settlement class). 
 150. Amchem Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 151. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 152. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613. 
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23(b)(1)(B) limited fund settlement classes.153  In addition, the Court in 
Ortiz reiterated the important due process requirements it had set forth 
two years earlier in its Amchem decision.154 
For the purposes of this discussion, the importance of the Amchem 
and Ortiz decisions is that the Supreme Court made it more difficult for 
the practicing bar to negotiate and resolve aggregate litigation, by 
setting forth clear due process and other requirements that litigants must 
satisfy and that courts must consider in order to approve a proposed 
class action settlement.155  Moreover, the Ortiz decision virtually 
ensured that few, if any, class actions would be approved under the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund provision.156 
By the end of the twentieth century, two class action trends were 
apparent: plaintiffs could be expected to encounter significant obstacles 
to certifying litigation classes in federal courts, and both sides of the 
docket would most likely encounter considerable impediments to 
negotiating and consummating class action settlements.  While the first 
trend gave an advantage to the corporate defense bar sued in massive 
class litigation, the second trend clearly was problematic for the plaintiff 
and defense bars when both sides mutually desired settlement of 
massive litigation.  The Amchem and Ortiz decisions also presented 
obstacles to federal judges who wished to expeditiously resolve massive 
litigation on their dockets, limiting the ability of judges to approve class 
action settlements subjected to due process objections. 
Against this backdrop—and after CAFA in 2005 ensured that most 
class litigation would be resolved in federal court—the interests of the 
plaintiff and defense bars (and the judiciary) converged to encourage 
development of a means for resolving complex litigation outside the 
confines of the Amchem and Ortiz decisions.  Thus, after 2005, 
corporate defendants involved in massive litigation led the way in 
favoring the multidistrict litigation statute as mechanism for resolving 
complex cases.  While in many instances corporate defendants sued in 
class litigation continue to oppose class certification, in other instances 
when corporate defendants have strategically decided to settle their 
 
 153. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 838–39. 
 154. Id. at 845. 
 155. Ironically, it is precisely these requirements and constraints that the Supreme Court has set 
forth in Amchem and Ortiz that Judge Weinstein, in his Zyprexa orders, has used as a justification and 
rationale for use of the concept of the quasi-class action.  See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. 
Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  In other words, Judge Weinstein views the Amchem and Ortiz decisions 
as obstacles to accomplishing settlements unbounded by the rule of law. 
 156. See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2005) (overturning class 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) nationwide punitive damage tobacco class action based on theory of 
constitutional limits on the amount of punitive damages that may be imposed on a defendant; 
requirements of Ortiz not satisfied in proposed class). 
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potential liabilities, they have clearly favored MDL auspices as the 
means for accomplishing global peace. 
Thus, whereas MDL procedure had once been something of a judicial 
backwater for large-scale litigation, MDL procedure rapidly has 
emerged in the twenty-first century as the preferred procedural umbrella 
under which to resolve aggregate litigation.  Now, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation almost immediately creates an MDL after the 
emergence of a defective products or pharmaceutical litigation.157  For 
the most part, the plaintiffs‘ bar—frustrated at its inability to gain class 
certification in many federal courts—has willingly gone along with this 
shift in litigation strategy.  In addition, MDL courts also have embraced 
their authority as an efficient way of docket-clearing massive litigation. 
C. The Illegitimate Expansion of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to 
Embrace the Quasi-Class Action 
The shift in the twenty-first century of aggregate litigation to MDL 
courts under MDL auspices is somewhat ironic in light of the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation‘s historical resistance to creating mass 
tort MDLs.158  The MDL Panel accomplished a major doctrinal break-
through in 1991, when the MDL Panel reversed its longstanding 
opposition to creation of an asbestos MDL.159  The panel‘s authorization 
of an asbestos MDL finally encouraged subsequent MDL panels to 
make increasing use of MDL procedures to resolve aggregate litigation. 
The rationales justifying the MDL‘s panel‘s reversal of course in 
1991 are worth noting, because the panel sounded the themes of judicial 
expediency, pragmatism, and fundamental justice in light of increasing 
docket congestion inspired by large-scale litigation.  Thus, the panel 
noted that ―we are persuaded that this [asbestos] litigation has reached a 
magnitude, not contemplated in the record before us in 1977, that 
threatens the administration of justice and that requires a new 
streamlined approach.‖160  In a similar vein, the panel indicated the 
following: 
 
 157. This trend towards rapid creation of MDL forums for massive cases holds true for other 
types of class litigation, including securities and antitrust cases. 
 158. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., ―Dalkon Shield‖ IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 610 F. Supp. 1099 
(J.P.M.D.L. 1985) (declining to create an MDL for Dalkon Shield litigation); In re Asbestos School 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 713 (J.P.M.D.L. 1985) (declining to create School Asbestos MDL); In 
re Ortho Pharm. ―Lippes Loop‖ Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 1073 (J.DP.M.D.L. 1978) (declining to 
create an MDL for Lippes Loop IUD litigation); In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (declining to create an asbestos MDL).  
 159. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.D.L. 1991) (authorizing 
creation of an asbestos MDL after five previous refusals by MDL panels to authorize creation of an 
asbestos MDL). 
 160. Id. at 418. 
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The heyday of individual adjudication of asbestos mass tort lawsuits had 
long passed. . . .  The reasons are obvious; the complexity of asbestos 
cases cases makes them too expensive to litigate; costs are exacerbated 
when each individual has to prove his or her claim de novo; high 
transaction costs reduce the recovery available to successful plaintiffs; 
and the sheer number of asbestos cases pending nationwide threatens to 
deny justice and compensation to many deserving claimants if each claim 
is handled individually.  The backlog is eroding a fundamental aspiration 




The panels‘ new-found embrace of the MDL approach to resolving 
mass tort litigation in 1991 has inspired paradoxical, unintended 
consequences.  On the one hand, the panel‘s 1991 decision authorizing 
creation of a nationwide asbestos MDL opened the floodgates to 
numerous, subsequent mass tort (and other) MDL litigations.162  On the 
other hand, it is worth remembering that the 1991 asbestos MDL was 
the incubator of the infamous Georgine global asbestos settlement,163 
which the Supreme Court repudiated in its 1997 Amchem decision.  
Ironically, then, the creation of the1991 asbestos MDL contained the 
seeds of its own destruction. 
Nonetheless, since 1991 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
has been motivated to create MDLs for almost all massive litigation that 
emerges on the federal docket.  Along with the increase in MDL 
proceedings, federal courts also have experienced a concomitant 
expansion of judicial authority in overseeing and managing MDL 
litigation.164  Whereas in the first three decades of MDL history the 
MDL forum was perceived as a successful venue for resolving massive 
litigation, the usual auspices for ultimately resolving such litigation 
under an MDL umbrella was through the class action mechanism.165  
Thus, after an MDL court managed pretrial discovery and motions 
practice, these efforts often resulted either in a class certification 
 
 161. Id. at 419 (internal citations omitted). 
 162. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.33 (2004) (citing numerous mass 
tort and other MDLs). 
 163. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing approval of 
global asbestos settlement class); Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(approving of asbestos settlement). 
 164. For example, MDL judges can oversee test-cases of selected cases within the MDL, and can 
coordinate resolution of similar cases with state court judges.  See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(FOURTH), supra note 162 at § 22.36. 
 165. Id; see also id. at n.1149 (noting that it is still an unresolved question whether, after 
certifying a class action in an MDL proceeding, an MDL court may then retain the class action for trial 
itself).  In 1998, the Supreme Court held that an MDL court had no authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to 
transfer an MDL case to itself for trial.  Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg, Wiess, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 523 
U.S. 26 (1998). 
35
Mullenix: DUBIOUS DOCTRINES: THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
424 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
motion,166 or in class settlement to be finalized and approved under the 
class action rule.167 
In the post-CAFA litigation landscape, however, while MDL forums 
have continued to provide fruitful venues for resolving aggregate 
litigation, some MDL judges and the parties involved now eschew the 
class action settlement within the MDL.  In contrast to past practice, and 
with the tactic encouragement and complicity of MDL judges, self-
interested parties instead now use MDL forums as means to negotiate, 
consummate, and finalize private deals outside the confines of the class 
action rule.  The MDL procedural mechanism, then, has been co-opted 
into a useful tool for settling massive claims without the constraints 
imposed by class action procedure.  The Vioxx and Zyprexa deals are 
perhaps the premier illustrations of precisely this phenomenon. 
*  * * 
The MDL statute and MDL procedure was never intended to confer 
such broad power and authority on a federal court to provide judicial 
cover for privately negotiated backroom settlement deals that do not 
comport with the rule of law, are subject to scant checks for abuse or 
due process violations, and that resolve the claims of perhaps thousands 
or hundreds of thousands of absent claimants.  This, however, is 
precisely the legacy of the quasi-class action. 
The MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, actually describes a meager and 
vague set of powers for MDL judges.168  The statute indicates that when 
civil actions involving ―one or more common questions of fact‖ are 
pending in different district courts, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
litigation may transfer such cases to any district ―for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings.‖169  The statute further states that 
MDL judges ―may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district 
for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or 
 
 166. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATX II, & Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev’d sub nom. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 167. See, e.g., In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(certifying settlement class); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 
1222042 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (certifying settlement class). 
 168. Almost the entire MDL statute describes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and 
how the Panel is constituted, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d); the grounds for initiation and creation of an MDL, 28 
U.S.C. § 1407(b), (c); review of orders issues by an MDL judge, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e); and the limitation 
excluding trial in the MDL forum, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).  The statute also contains miscellaneous 
sections delineating civil action that may or may not be subject to MDL proceedings.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407(g)–(h) (2006). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
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consolidated pretrial proceedings.‖170  That is the extent of powers 
authorized to MDL transferee judges under the MDL statute.  Over the 
past five decades, MDL judges have exercised authority to decide 
motions to remand cases from the MDL, coordinate and consolidate 
cases pending in different districts, identify differences in applicable 
law, and seek information from parties as to the status of cases in order 
to determine how to proceed with pretrial discovery and other 
motions.171 
In addition, MDL judges have exercised authority to dispose of cases 
by ruling on the merits, by granting summary judgment.  More recently, 
MDL judges have exercised authority to carve out limited issues classes 
to resolve common issues or try test cases originally filed in the 
transferee court or refilled in the transferee court.172  Summarizing the 
scope of judicial authority of an MDL judge, however, the FJC‘s 
Manual for Complex Litigation simply concludes: 
The transferee judge usually supervises discovery, decides motions, and, 
if called for, decides whether to certify a class action. Under the 
decentralized approach, the transferee judge would then remand the cases 
to their original districts for trial . . . .  In other cases, grants of summary 




Thus, the express text of the MDL statute and the history of MDL 
procedure has been one of limited delegation of authority of a federal 
MDL judge to consolidate and coordinate pre-trial proceedings.  Over 
time, this authority has expanded to encourage settlements under MDL 
auspices, but always within the purview of the class action rule. After 
the Supreme Court in Amchem repudiated a global class action 
settlement consummated in the asbestos MDL—largely because of due 
process defects—the Court inadvertently spurred on a movement by 
actors seeking global resolution of large-scale liabilities to retain the 
good offices of the MDL proceeding, but to avoid the class action rule 
altogether in achieving ultimate settlement. Hence, in the post-Amchem 
era, it is not surprising to see the embrace of the quasi-class action by 
Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa litigation, and Judge Fallon in the Vioxx 
litigation, as a means of accomplishing an end-run around the rule of 
law.  In the realm of unintended consequences, this cannot possibly be 
 
 170. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (emphasis added).  The statute also indicates that the MDL Panel ―may 
prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with the Acts of Congress and the federal 
Rules of Civil procedure.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1407(f).  This, however, is a power of the Panel, rather than the 
MDL transferee judge. 
 171. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 162, at § 22.36. 
 172. Id. (citing examples). 
 173. Id. 
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what the Court intended in its Amchem and Ortiz decisions. 
III. THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION AS THE EMBODIMENT OF LAWLESS 
AGGREGATE CLAIMS RESOLUTION 
The Zyprexa and Vioxx litigations present two contrasting examples 
of use of the quasi-class action concept.  Arguably, Judge Weinstein‘s 
invocation of the quasi-class action construct in the Zyprexa litigation 
illustrates an admirable application of the concept; Judge Weinstein 
employed this theory to enable him to adjust the private attorney fee 
contracts that would have extracted high contingency fees from 
claimants.  In this instance, Judge Weinstein‘s invocation of the quasi-
class action was used for a commendable end, which was to protect 
claimants from excessive attorney fees. 
On the other hand, Judge Fallon invoked the quasi-class action 
conceit to enable him to issue post-settlement orders that affected the 
rights of non-settling parties; in exercising this authority under the rubric 
of the quasi-class action, Judge Fallon became an active participant in 
enforcing provisions of a private settlement deal that had not been 
subject to class fairness scrutiny, which orders resulted in the dismissal 
of certain claimants‘ claims. Judge Fallon‘s use of the quasi-class action 
conceit in the Vioxx litigation, then, was a far cry from Judge 
Weinstein‘s invocation of the concept in Zyprexa, and represents a 
troubling expansion of the concept.  In this instance, deployment of the 
quasi-class action concept was used to harm the interests of at least 
some segment of the universe of potential Vioxx claimants. 
As discussed above, it is easy to understand why various actors 
involved in complex aggregate litigation have embraced MDL 
proceedings and the concept of the quasi-class action.  Thus, plaintiffs 
and defendant may now mutually enjoy the good offices of an MDL 
judge to settle massive liabilities without concern that any agreement 
they reach will have to undergo the rigorous certification and fairness 
analysis required by the formal class action rule.  In this regard, Judge 
Weinstein was shrewdly correct in his appreciation that the Amchem and 
Ortiz decisions created impediments to resolution of mass tort litigation.  
Instead, parties involved in MDL proceedings now can simply go off 
and cut whatever deal satisfies the interests of the attorneys involved in 
negotiations, without fear of judicial check. 
On the other hand, it could not possibly have been the intention of the 
Supreme Court, in deciding Amchem and Ortiz, to encourage litigants to 
simply circumvent the mandates of those decisions by creating a new 
pseudo concept that sounds like a class action, but evades all due 
process requirements.  The quasi-class action represents the worst-
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possible outcome after Amchem and Ortiz: aggregate class settlements 
not subject to class action due process requirements. 
It is well worth recalling that the underlying Amchem litigation 
involved a controversial narrative of a private, backroom collusive 
settlement that benefitted some class members at the expense of others, 
resolved the defendants‘ massive asbestos liabilities, and amply 
rewarded class counsel with attorney fees.  The backroom, collusive 
nature of the so-called Georgine deal inspired a firestorm of criticism,174 
and ultimately caused the Supreme Court to repudiate the deal in 
Amchem, and to reject a similarly infected deal in Ortiz.  Yet, in spite of 
Amchem and Ortiz, with the advent of the Zyprexa and Vioxx deals, we 
have returned to an era of back-room settlements that inspired such 
controversy in the 1990s. 
The objection may be raised that there is nothing wrong with 
privately negotiated settlement deals.  Indeed, private settlements 
frequently are accomplished by counsel, or under the umbrella of 
mediation or arbitration.  However, in ordinary litigation the client is 
actually present to oversee settlement negotiations, and to modify, 
approve, or disapprove a proposed settlement.  In the mediation or 
arbitration, the client gives prior consent to be bound by the 
determinations of an impartial intermediary. 
Modern MDL proceedings that consolidate thousands of claims, on 
the other hand, are unlike other private settlement auspices.  Detached 
from class action status, claimants who are the subject of an MDL 
proceeding are largely unmoored from representation.  While class 
certification, at a minimum, ensures adequate representation at the 
outset of proceedings—both by adequate representatives and class 
counsel—individuals involved in an MDL proceeding have no assurance 
that anyone is protecting their interests.  Furthermore, there are few 
mechanisms that provide claimants with meaningful opportunities to 
consent to ongoing negotiations or the results of negotiations. 
Thus, MDL settlement negotiations that are conducted outside the 
auspices of the class action mechanism encourage precisely the type of 
self-dealing and collusion among the attorneys which became the object 
of criticism in Amchem.  With judicial embrace of the notion of a quasi-
class action, we have returned to a pre-Amchem era of lawless aggregate 
claims resolution. Worse still, under the rubric of the quasi-class action, 
the federal judiciary now provides an equally quasi-judicial imprimatur 
to such dealings. 
 
 174. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem 
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass 
Torts, And “Settlement Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995) (devoting 
entire issue to critical commentary of the Georgine settlement). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In 2009, discussing his role as the Special Master overseeing the 
World Trade Center Victims‘ Compensation Fund,175 Ken Feinberg used 
this opportunity to embrace the concept of the quasi-class action.176  As 
the administrator of both the WTC Fund and the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility,177 it is easy to appreciate Ken Feinberg‘s endorsement of the 
concept of the quasi-class action, with its free-form approach to 
aggregate claims resolution. 
Given his prestige and authority as a special master involved in 
numerous large-scale litigations, Ken Feinberg‘s embrace and 
endorsement of the concept of the quasi-class action ought to be viewed 
with some alarm.  Even more troubling is the support and adoption of 
the quasi-class action concept in other quarters,178 with suggestions that 
the authority of MDL judges ought to be expanded in significant ways, 
but amendment of the MDL statute. 
Private parties should not be permitted to hijack MDL procedure, 
either to negotiate away their liabilities under the cloak of law, or to gain 
ample attorney fees.  MDL procedure should not be usurped to permit 
back-room deals consummated free from the constraints of due process 
that are intended to protect absent individuals.  The current MDL statute 
and the history of MDL proceedings do not support expansive powers of 
federal judges overseeing such consolidated cases to provide judicial 
cover for privately negotiated class action deals not subject to class 
action due process requirements.  Moreover, the MDL statute does not 
provide authority for an MDL judge to exercise power over recalcitrant 
 
 175. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 
Stat. 230 (2001) codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006); Kenneth R. Feinberg et al., FINAL REPORT OF 
THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (2004), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf. 
 176. Kenneth Feinberg, Transparency and Civil Justice: The Internal and External Value of 
Sunlight, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 476. (2009) (citing to In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 
230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).  Feinberg stated: 
Read Judge Weinstein‘s Zyprexa opinion last year.  He‘s coined a new phrase: a ―quasi-class,‖ 
mainly the principles governing due process and notice in Rule 23 may be, and should be, 
transferrable to any aggregative claim, even if it‘s not a Rule 23 class, dealing with notification 
of claimants, legal fees, opt-out rights or rights not to participate in an aggregative settlement; a 
very valuable opinion discussing how in the twenty-first century some of the principles 
governing notice in Rule 23 ought to also be deemed important in a non-23 aggregative 
situation.  He was focusing on the Zyprexa case involving the settlement of 700 MDL non-class 
claims. 
 177. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility website is located at http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com.  The 
website includes a ―Frequently Asked Questions‖ section, located at 
http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq.  See Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast 
Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Litigation—A Fund Too Far, 78 LA. L. REV. 819 
(2011).  
 178. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION ch. 3 (2010). 
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claimants who object to private deals consummated outside the purview 
of the class action rule. 
The notion of the quasi-class action is not justified by statute, rule, 
precedent, or any other authority.  It is a judicially-created label 
intended to provide judges overseeing MDL or other aggregate 
proceedings with an aura of judicial legitimacy.  The quasi-class action 
is the antithesis of the rule of law, providing instead a mantle of legality 
to unbounded, freewheeling aggregate claims resolution.  As such, this 
dubious doctrine ought to be repudiated. 
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